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Abstract: In this paper, I investigate one popular view in current methodological debate about musical ontology, 
namely, descriptivism. According to descriptivism, the task of musical ontology is to offer a description of the 
‘structure of our thought’ (Kania, 2008, p. 437) about musical works, as it manifests itself in actual musical practices. 
In this regard, descriptivists often appeal to our pre-theoretical intuitions to ground ontological theories of musical 
works. 
This method, however, is worrisome, as such intuitions are unstable and contradictory. For example, there is a broad 
variety of intuitions in our musical practice concerning what counts as an authentic performance of a musical work. 
All such intuitions reflect at least a part of actual practice; however, they are in conflict with each other. This raises a 
problem, for how can they thus represent a reliable basis for our ontology? A further worry for descriptivism 
concerns the triviality of the knowledge it gives us access to. If, according to descriptivism, the task of musical 
ontologists is simply to codify the regularities found in our intuitive thought or discourse about practice, then how 
can the resulting theories be informative at all with regard to the object of their concern?  
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__________________________________________________________________________________ 
In this paper, I investigate one popular view in current methodological debate about musical ontology1, 
namely, descriptivism. A few famous exceptions aside2, the majority of scholars in the debate lean today 
towards what has been called a ‘descriptive’ metaphysical approach (Strawson, 1959, p. 9) one concerned 
with providing an ontological theory of musical works that proves consistent with our intuitive thought 
and discourses about actual musical practice3, rather than with the demands of abstract metaphysics.  
One main worry for descriptivism concerns the reliability of what it takes as the main sources for 
ontological theorizing, i.e., the pre-theoretic intuitions that are implicit in, or govern our artistic practices. 
Sometimes these intuitions are contradictory, and support opposing ontological theories on the same 
subject. Sometimes they are just vague or confused, and do not offer us much guidance to decide on 
puzzle cases. For example, there is a broad variety of intuitions in our musical practice concerning what 
counts as an authentic performance of a musical work. All such intuitions reflect at least a part of actual 
practice; however, they are in conflict with each other. This raises a problem, for how can they thus 
represent a trustworthy basis for our ontology? A further worry for descriptivism concerns the triviality of 
                                                     
1 Though musical ontology represents my main focus here, all the considerations made in this paper can be extended 
to the ontology of art broadly construed. This is because the ontology of music is generally developed within, and in 
relation to, the more comprehensive framework of the ontology of art. 
2 One notable example is Dodd (2012, 2017), who can be considered, a committed assertor of revisionism in musical 
meta-ontology. 
3 ‘Actual musical practice’, here and in the rest of the paper, stands for the different activities of composers, 
performers, critics and educated audiences. 
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the knowledge it gives us access to. If, according to descriptivism, the task of musical ontologists is simply 
to codify the regularities found in our intuitive thought or discourse about practice (Kania, 2008), then 
how can the resulting theories be informative at all with regard to the object of their concern? 
Despite the extent of these worries, I argue that a possible strategy to rescue descriptivism against 
criticism is the so-called method of reflective equilibrium, as originally envisaged by John Rawls (1971) in the 
field of philosophical ethics. Adopting reflective equilibrium may provide descriptivism with a procedure 
to filter or systematize pre-theoretical intuitions, thus making it more resistant to the problems generated 
by the instability and inconsistency of intuitions. Recourse to reflective equilibrium, on the other hand, 
may give descriptivists a tool to revise some aspects of their data in light of reflections that lead to the 
most coherent ontological theory of musical works. In this way, ontology retains its explanatory validity (see: 
Kraut, 2014; Davies, 2017).  
In what follows, I begin by offering a brief overview of current debate in musical ontology. A great part of 
the discussion seems driven today by a meta-ontological concern, aimed to establish how musical ontology 
needs to be done, i.e., its proper methods and purposes. I then present descriptivism for how it has been 
construed by some of its proponents (Kania, 2008; Thomasson, 2004; 2005; 2006). After considering the 
main worries faced by descriptivist-oriented theories, I discuss the possible benefits of applying reflective 
equilibrium to a descriptivist ontology of art. 
1. Introduction 
Throughout the past decades, the ontology of music has attracted an ever-increasing deal of attention on 
the part of analytic philosophers. The causes are a matter for speculation, but two are at least likely. First, 
the contemporary renaissance in fundamental metaphysics, which has had such major impact on analytic 
philosophy in general and on analytic aesthetics in particular (Thomasson, 2004, p. 92).4 Second, the 
growing recognition that musical works present their own independently interesting dilemmas for anyone 
concerned with the discipline of ontology. Out of the astounding number of issues that have been 
brought to discussion, the following debates can be isolated. 
The first is what Julian Dodd (2008, p. 1113) calls ‘the categorial debate’: What kind of ontological 
category do musical works belong to? Some classical positions contend that works of music are sets or 
classes of performances (Goodman, 1968), abstract entities (Wollheim, 1968) eternal sound-types (Dodd, 
2007), initiated types (Levinson, 1980; 1990), etc.   
A second debate revolves around what Dodd (2008, p. 1113) calls the ‘individuation question’: What 
conditions must a performance satisfy to be an authentic performance of a musical work? Answer to this 
question implies determining what kinds of properties are essential to a work’s identity (Davies, 2001). 
Whether an authentic performance of a work has to comply with the script (Goodman, 1968) or with 
composer’s instrumentation, tempo and dynamics (Levinson, 1979) depends indeed on which of these 
features are considered essential. 
Finally, there is the issue raised by non-standard musical genres: How to think of those musical forms that 
do not belong to the classical tradition? Philosophers committed to the ‘comparatist’ debate (Kania, 2017) 
                                                     
4 In fact, one may wonder how ontology could flourish precisely within analytic philosophy, i.e., within a kind of 
philosophy that, for many years, was hostile to the very idea of metaphysics. Arguably, ontology became respectable 
again in 1948, when Quine published his famous paper titled On What There Is. It was Quine – against the 
Carnapian tradition – who made ontology a serious subject. 
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maintain that many arguments in the ontology of classical music are simply not applicable to music such 
as jazz, rock and pop (Kania, 2006; Young – Matheson 2000; Gracyk 1996; Pouivet 2010) and that these 
genres deserve independent investigation. 
1.2 Deflationist Trends and the Methodological Turn in Musical Ontology 
In recent years, perhaps as a side-effect of this newly matured interest, deflationism5 about the whole 
enterprise of musical ontology has spread in the literature. Many have replied negatively to the question of 
whether ontology can tell us anything but trivial about music, and critics have probed the value of each 
debate in the field.   
Some have doubted that categorial discussions are genuine in the first place. James Young (2014) has argued, 
for instance, that the issue of finding out the fundamental ontological category to which musical works 
belong should be dismissed as a “pseudo-problem”. Suppose all musical works were eternal sound-types 
that are discovered and not created. How could this have any impact on our aesthetic appreciation of 
them? (Young, 2011, p. 297; 2014, p. 15).   
Alternatively, criticisms against the identification debate have been raised by Aaron Ridley (2004), who 
denies that the ontology of music will ever provide us with any relevant aesthetic payoff. A sensible 
philosophical relationship to music should consist, according to Ridley, in figuring out how to evaluate 
musical performances, but the self-representing value-neutral ontological debate over musical works is 
irrelevant in this regard (Ridley, 2004, pp. 113–114). 
More recently, there have also been arguments against the allegedly overly-complicated comparatist 
approaches to musical ontology. The problem here is that identifying a different ontological category for 
each musical genre or tradition seems to multiply entities beyond necessity (Kania, 2017). We may want to 
distinguish works in rock music from works in folk, indie, progressive rock and so on, but this looks like a 
slippery slope: how far can we go (Dodd, 2014)?  
As a way out of the deflationist trend, an increasing number of scholars have recently started to shift the 
focus of attention from first-order debates6 to issues concerning methodology, i.e., the procedurals, methods 
and criteria that lie at the basis of ontology. One shared feeling in this regard is that in the absence of 
“agreed-upon methodological standards”, controversies in the field of musical ontology will show little 
hope of being resolved (Thomasson, 2006). In this vein, something as a ‘methodological turn’ has started 
to make its way in the philosophical community. In a nutshell, participants in the methodological debate 
search for adequate answers to three fundamental questions: 
1. What are the suitable objects or data for musical ontology?  Which sources should we consider while 
formulating an ontological theory? Which may be relevant and which may not? 2. How ought ontological 
theorizing to be accomplished? What norms or criteria should guide us in formulating an ontological 
theory? 3. Why shall one engage in the ontology of music? What is (or should be) the purpose of ontological 
investigations about music? What kind of knowledge do we hope to obtain?  
These three questions are obviously interconnected. Different data seem to require different 
methodological treatments, and one’s understanding of the purpose of ontology impinge on the method 
                                                     
5 I take ‘deflationism’ here as the view according to which answers to ontological questions are just trivial or verbal 
ones, and that ontological disputes are therefore non-substantial. 
6 It is common to distinguish ‘first-order’ debates made within ontological discourse, from ‘higher-order’ debates 
made about ontological discourse.  
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one chooses to adopt. Ultimately, it seems that one cannot separate the question of how we should do 
musical ontology from the question of what we can expect musical ontology to do for us. For instance, if 
one takes musical ontology as an enterprise able to add to the sum of our knowledge by discovering new 
and potentially debunking facts about musical phenomena, along the line of the empirical sciences, certain 
conclusions on its proper procedures would follow. Alternatively, if one thinks that the task of musical 
ontology is to enable us to attain a clearer understanding of what is implicit in our musical practice, 
opposite conclusions would obtain with respect to methodology. 
In the literature, these two approaches are respectively defined revisionism – the idea that our best 
ontological theories can debunk our folk-intuitions about musical phenomena –, and descriptivism – the idea 
that the task of ontology is to describe and/or codify the folk-intuitions shared by participants in the 
musical practice. As renown, the distinction between revisionism and descriptivism can be traced back to a 
tradition coming prominently from Peter Strawson (1959), who introduces it to discuss the broader issue 
of determining the task of general metaphysics.  
In the following section, I will present and discuss descriptivism for how it has been construed by some of 
its major proponents in the literature about musical ontology. I will then consider some of the major 
problems in which this methodology seems to incur.  
2. Descriptivism  
In Strawson’s view, a descriptive metaphysics is one that “describes the actual structure of our thought about the 
world” (Strawson, 1959, p. 9) – our perception of the world for how it is reflected in ordinary thought and 
language.7 According to this general characterization, descriptive metaphysics’ main aim is the finding of 
reasons for what we believe “on instinct”. Instinctive beliefs form what Strawson calls “our conceptual 
scheme”, a repertoire of pre-theoretical intuitions, thoughts and insights that shape our common-sensical 
image of the world and remain somehow stable beyond and before the philosophical revolutions caused 
by the changing of metaphysical paradigms8. Making this core of shared concepts explicit and contributing 
to their clarification is precisely what Strawson thinks the business of the descriptivist metaphysician 
should be. In this scenario, metaphysics is not committed toward discovering new truths about a particular 
issue, for “there are no new truths to be discovered” (Strawson, 1959, p. 10), but relies upon the method of 
conceptual analysis; indeed: “a close examination of the actual use of words is the best, and indeed the only sure, way in 
philosophy” (Strawson, 1959, p. 9).  
Significantly, one first attempt to import methodological descriptivism in the art-ontological debate was 
made by Jerrold Levinson.9 If there is anything like a ‘conceptual scheme’ in the field of music10, Levinson 
                                                     
7 Revisionary metaphysics, on the contrary, is one that “is concerned to produce a better structure” (Strawson, 1959, 
p. 9), presumably one that pictures the world as it is, independently of our thought about it. 
8 “There are categories and concepts which, in their most fundamental character, change not at all […] It is with these, their 
interconnections, and the structure that they form, that a descriptive metaphysics will be primarily concerned” (Strawson, 1959, pp. 11–
12).   
9 At least according to the reconstruction provided by Kania (2008). Kania claims that Levinson’s paper has 
produced a sort of methodological ‘turnaround’ in the debate about musical ontology, by setting out a whole new set 
of priorities. 
10 This is, however, controversial. To adapt Strawson’s notion of ‘conceptual scheme’ to the musical domain, one 
should assume that there exists something as a perennial and a-historical ‘musical common sense’. This assumption, 
however, can be criticized both diachronically, by saying that theories on music has evolved throughout history, and 
synchronically, by considering that different cultural and social traditions have their own different pre-theoretical 
conception of music (see: Ruta, 2013). 
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contends in a famous paper (1980), it must be the task of ontology to unearth it. This point is made clear 
in his defense of the commonly-held intuition that musical works are created rather than discovered. We 
should hold onto ‘creationism’, Levinson argues, because this “is one of the most firmly entrenched of our beliefs 
about art”, and what’s more, one which is really ubiquitous (Levinson, 1990, p. 216). More generally, 
Levinson’s concern in the paper is with demonstrating that priority must be given to the demands of the 
actual musical practice rather than to the demands of abstract metaphysics. An ontology which favors abstract 
theoretical virtues such as parsimony and consistency to adherence to musical practice is doomed to lose 
its grip. This is why, according to Levinson, only a descriptivist methodology can obtain for musical 
ontology.  
In recent decades, many philosophers have complied with Levinson’s call for a descriptivist musical 
ontology. A nice example is Amie Thomasson (2004; 2005; 2006). In her writings about art ontology, 
Thomasson argues that investigating artworks’ ontological status means analyzing the assumptions that are 
embodied in the discourses of those “competent speakers who ground and reground reference of our art terms” such 
as ‘work of music’ (Thomasson, 2005, p. 226). In Thomasson’s view, these assumptions are conceived as 
forming something analogous to Strawson’s conceptual scheme, a rather general background conception 
that supports structure for all related artistic practices such as performing, analysing, criticizing etc. The 
proper way to approach art ontology is therefore, according to Thomasson, by paying attention to how 
this background conception grounds the reference of art-kind terms as used in the ordinary discourses of 
art-connoisseurs (Thomasson, 2004; 2005). To investigate the ontological status of a sonata, for example, 
we need to analyze the rules that determine the conditions of application of the term in the context of the 
relevant practices. Ontological inquiries should thus consist, according to Thomasson, in a ‘conceptual 
analysis’ of the way in which musical and art concepts are used by competent speakers; the appropriate 
methodology being to codify “the assumptions about ontological status built into the relevant practices and beliefs of 
those dealing with works of art, to systematize these, and put them into philosophical terms” (Thomasson, 2004, pp 87–
88).  
Another version of descriptivism is defended by Andrew Kania (2008; 2012). Kania takes as his starting 
point the fact that we have certain ontological intuitions about musical and artistic works that are “rooted 
in our practice” – that we believe that musical works come to existence via an act of composition, that 
they are repeatable etc. (Kania, 2008, p. 431). These intuitions, he argues, should constitute the basis of 
ontological investigations. Indeed, according to Kania, musical and art works, qua cultural artefacts, are 
determined in their nature and properties on the system of beliefs that governs complex socio-artistic 
practices (Kania, 2008, p. 438). This means, according to Kania, that musical works do not possess a 
nature which is independent of the way we conceive them in the context of actual practice: “how musical works 
are depends upon how people think about them” (Kania, 2008, p. 438). As a consequence, what ontological 
inquiries must do is to try to describe and make explicit our pre-theoretic thought about music. 
Descriptivism, as the methodology aimed at “offering a description of the ‘structure of our thought’ about artworks” 
(Kania, 2008, p. 437), is thus the only suitable methodology for musical ontology. But if “in proposing a 
theory of the ontology of art we are really offering a description of the ‘structure of our thought’ about artworks, then the 
existence and nature of such philosophical arcana as types, properties, and so on, look like they might be beside the point” 
(Kania, 2008, p. 437). 
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2.1 Descriptivism’s Conceptual Structure 
While the list of contemporary philosophers embracing one or another type of descriptivism could go 
on11, we have now sufficient ground to enucleate what seems to be the basic conceptual structure 
underlying descriptivism, as a methodology for musical ontology. For this purpose, we may refer to the 
three central questions mentioned above. 
1. What-question (what are the suitable objects or data for musical ontology?): According to 
descriptivism, our pre-theoretical intuitions, as implicit in wide-spread social practices regarding the arts 
and music, provide us with the central data to be explained by ontological means. Basic facts about 
the ontological status of artworks – their existence, identity and persistence conditions – can be 
‘extracted’ from such intuitive data found in the actual practices.   
2. How-question (how ought aesthetic theorizing to be accomplished?): in the descriptivist picture, 
the criteria to be used in construing and evaluating different ontological proposals rely 
fundamentally in the coherence with practice. This means that no correct ontological theory of 
musical works can substantially overthrow our pre-theoretical ways of thinking of the various 
artworks.  
3. Why-question (what is the purpose of doing musical ontology?): according to descriptivism, the 
main aim of art ontology is to capture and describe the way in which people think and talk about 
artworks in the context of the actual social practices related to the different arts.  
This has a bearing on the limits of the possible knowledge acquirable through ontological investigations. In 
cases where our practices are unclear about certain aspects – say, how many mistakes can be made in if a 
performance is to count as an instance of a certain work, etc. – our ontological picture itself shall be 
vague. As a consequence, there may simply be no ultimate answer to these questions. Indeed, according to 
descriptivism, either ontological disputes are answerable through analysis of our practices and examination 
of our folk intuitions, or they must be considered as unanswerable. Since our ontological knowledge is 
gleaned through human conception, it may turn out to be just ‘ontologically shallow’, in the sense that 
“there is nothing more to discover about them than what our practices themselves determine” (Thomasson, 2005, p. 228). 
3. Some Worries for Descriptivism  
If my reconstruction is correct, and despite the contemporary success of descriptivist approaches in art 
ontology12, we have prima facie a number of reasons to worry about descriptivism’s main assumptions. In 
particular, what strikes one as particularly troublesome is the role attributed in this view to our pre-
theoretical intuitions. One can notice, in the first place, a confusion in terminology. How are we to figure 
out what descriptivism means by the term ‘intuitions’? Throughout the history of philosophy, the notion 
of ‘intuition’ has taken on an enormous number of connotations. Descriptivists do not seem to be 
concerned with the nuance the notion acquires in Kantian philosophy, nor do they seem to refer to 
something as an inner sense or a special faculty of any kind. But then, do they consider the intuitions 
                                                     
11 A further form of descriptivism is endorsed by Guy Rohrbaugh (2003; 2013) Whatever artworks are 
metaphysically, Rohrbaugh claims, first and foremost they are the objects of our thought, discourse, appreciation and 
evaluation (Rohrbaugh, 2013, p. 29). Therefore, according to Rohrbaugh, ontology should be consistent with and 
responsive to artistic practice, if it wants to understand the objects of its concern. However, Rohrbaugh resist the 
idea that the task of ontology is limited to capture the way we intuitively think of artworks in our artistic practices. 
12 Julian Dodd calls it “the hegemonic thesis in the metaontology of art” (Dodd, 2012, p. 1050). 
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philosophers of music are supposed to work with innate beliefs? Or are they rather taken as spontaneous 
unreflective judgments? Should they be considered as ‘self-evidently true’ or merely ‘appealing’?  
Secondly, and whatever definition one may choose to adopt, a stronger set of concerns addresses the idea 
that intuitions may warrant our knowledge about the relevant things. This line of reasoning seems based on 
a simple analogy. Just as perception, in empirical science, provides us with evidence of how things stand in 
the extra-mental world, intuitions provide us with the relevant evidence about the ontological status of the 
things we are concerned with. But is this analogy tenable? Do intuitions really constitute a reliable basis on 
which to ground our ontology?   
3.1 Instability of Intuitions 
The first standard problem for musical descriptivist concerns the unstable nature of intuitions. Indeed, we 
all know that more often than not our intuitions are variable and mutable. Our practices and beliefs 
regarding music and the arts are not constant in time but change according to period, culture, social 
contingencies, and the intrinsic development of art itself. Throughout history, different groups of people 
have constructed different vocabularies for speaking about music according to their personal interests and 
practices; that is, they have referred to musical works as entities with varying identity and persistence 
conditions, even if they have apparently been using the very same words to describe them. For example, at 
Bach’s time what people meant when talking about ‘music’ was obviously different from what 
Beethoven’s contemporaries indicated with the same word. Accordingly, Lydia Goehr (2007) has 
contended that the modern ‘work-concept’ – the concept of the multiply instanceable musical work – 
didn’t have any ‘regulative force’ in the musical practice before the nineteenth-century, in the sense that it 
did not shape how music was viewed at that time. In the same way, one can argue that the use of the term 
‘musical work’ has changed after Cage’s 4’33’’.13    
More generally, the issue is that if our beliefs, intentions and practices regarding the arts vary across time 
and space, then the insights they give us about ontological issues will vary accordingly; and this ultimately 
implies that our ontological description of the (art) world will change along with how we think and act. 
This variation, however, not only undermines the claim that our ways of talking and thinking may provide 
us with stable knowledge of ontological facts, but also exposes descriptivism to the risk of cultural 
relativism. The point is tricky, since evidence of cultural and historical variation cannot be denied. Thus, 
either one simply foregoes descriptivism or one has to assume that the ontological truth about the thing 
referred to by our musical discourse changes when the use of language changes. But then one has also to 
face the following: that people in different epochs or cultures are really speaking about ‘different things’ 
when they refer to works of music, so the very possibility of a mutual understanding needs to be 
explained.   
3.2 Inconsistency of Intuitions 
If the argument for variation were the only challenge to descriptivism, however, one would not need to be 
too concerned. Differences in intuitions may indeed be cause for some concern, but they do not strike 
descriptivism at its heart.14 A much more problematic issue for descriptivism tackles the intrinsic conflict 
                                                     
13 Though whether Cage’s piece can properly count as a musical work is debatable (see: Davies, 1997). 
14 Indeed, our ontological categories themselves may be thought as dynamic, arbitrary, unsystematic and so on, in 
ways that reflect these features of the intuitions. This consideration may eventually lead philosophers to embrace an 
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between our intuitions in a certain domain. People normally have conflicting intuitions, intuitions that are 
mutually inconsistent and contradictory; just think of intuitions about, say, which party is going to win an 
election, or what the chances are that next winter will be warmer than the past one, and the like.  
In the artistic domain as well, our intuitions are often chaotic and inconsistent. Musical practice looks 
realistically more like a jungle of muddled actions and opinions than a well-ordered landscape of shared 
judgments and attitudes from which to draw any consistent evidence. Expert people, i.e. professional 
musicians, practitioners and critics, are far from possessing a common set of ideas when it comes to the 
use of the relevant concepts. No easy consensus is to be found in their ‘ordinary discourses’; at least none 
that supplies us with clear and consistent answers to our philosophical problem. Therefore, when one tries 
to answer ontological questions by examining musical practices, what one gets are a number of different 
and mutually contradictory intuitive answers.  
The case of musical ontologists is paradigmatic here. Different philosophers, mostly based on their 
individual intuitions, have varying ideas about what the ontological category of musical works is, ideas that 
are incompatible and sometimes irreconcilable. As we have seen, some claim that musical works are 
abstract types that exist for all time, unchanging in their constitutive properties, and therefore are merely 
discovered by their composers (Wolterstorff, 1980; Kivy, 1983; Dodd, 2000; 2007). Others find this 
position unsustainable, and in particular see the ‘eternalist’ consequence to be deeply unintuitive 
(Levinson, 1980; 1990). Significantly, both claims have been argued for on the grounds that they satisfy 
our intuitions about the distinction between work and performance (Bartel, 2017, p. 349). But if even the 
philosophers’ intuitions provide different answers at different times, then how can we trust the reliability 
of intuitions? The contradictory nature of intuitions, in other words, puts into question the very idea that 
they may represent something comparable to perception for guiding us to what is real, outside of our 
mental and linguistic structures. Indeed, if intuitions were a kind of ‘perception’ of ontological facts, or if 
they were bona fide reflections, objective mental representations of ontological data – judgments governed 
by norms of truth and validity – we probably won’t disagree so often about which ones are true. 
3.3 Triviality of Intuitions 
A third, broader, concern for descriptivism addresses the way in which it uses musical intuitions to build up 
an ontological theory. Even granted that intuitions represent a reliable source from which to draw our 
data, if, according to descriptivism, ontological investigations must confine themselves to mirror these data, 
then it is difficult to understand what kind of knowledge about musical phenomena they are to attain. In 
other words, in the descriptivist practice, we cannot obtain by means of an ontological inquiry any 
knowledge about the nature of musical works which is additional to, or simply different from, the knowledge 
already contained in our intuitions concerning musical practice. An ontology driven by a descriptive 
commandment – one aimed to describe, in Kania’s terms, the ‘structure of our thought’, looks ultimately 
unable to account for any of the things it is meant to account for, namely the nature and role of artworks 
in artistic practices. Since descriptivist theories are not pretending to reflect reality in any objective way, 
but only to ratify how we conceive it, all of what they left us with is a report of what we say, our façon de 
parler of the artistic world.  
For example, one might think that one contribution ontology could make to our musical knowledge is to 
help us clarify puzzle cases, i.e. cases in which our intuitions about one aspect of the practice are vague or 
                                                                                                                                                                      
ontological historicism, in the sense of Ian Hacking (2004), that testifies to the complexity of the phenomena under 
examination (see: Giombini, 2017, pp. 255–260). 
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ambiguous – alleged instances of copyright infringement, for instance, where there is disagreement about 
how much one can copy a musical work without committing plagiarism. Admittedly, however, 
descriptivism cannot bring us any closer to whatever ontological ‘truth’ there is to know in these cases, 
since it can only ratify the ambiguity of our intuitions, as reflected in the practice. But if descriptivism only 
tells us what we already know, its intellectual contribution to the study of musical phenomena is trifle, at 
best – then why should one engage in ontological investigations altogether? Descriptivist methodology, 
thus, leaves the door open to deflationism, defined, as mentioned before, as the view that ontology is in 
the end a ‘worthless’ enterprise: “An incredible amount of effort and ingenuity has been invested in trying to find the 
one true ontology of musical works. It has been wasted” (Young, 2011, p. 297). 
4. Reflective Equilibrium: a Possible Strategy? 
Scepticism about intuition as a reliable source of ontology, together with concerns about the trifle results 
obtained by descriptivist approaches to musical ontology, may lead one to give up on such methodology 
altogether. This conclusion, however, might be hasty. It can indeed be argued that the last section presents 
a too rough interpretation of descriptivism, and that a more refined version of it might in fact be able to 
mitigate, if not resolve, the problems highlighted.  
So what would this version be like? Ideally, this should be an account that enables one to revise the 
contradictory consequences of ‘simple’ descriptivism, while holding fast to its main premise, i.e., the 
primacy given to actual musical practice. In other words, since there are many mutually incompatible 
claims about the nature of art and musical works, and no less disagreement about pre-theoretical 
intuitions, what one needs is a procedure for determining which intuitions to give up and which to hold on 
to. To put it simply, what is required is a strategy for selecting which intuitions and claims to treat as 
central and which to consider marginal, and to justify those choices.  
A possible solution in this sense is a method originally developed in the context of philosophical ethics by 
John Rawls (1971), who also coined the term, namely, reflective equilibrium. Rawls identifies the method in 
the work of Nelson Goodman and notes that it is not limited to social and political philosophy: Goodman 
for instance uses it to evaluate competing theories of deductive and inductive logic (Goodman, 1955, pp. 
65–68). What’s more, according to Rawls, we can retrospectively find usage of the method throughout the 
history of philosophy: he suggests that it goes as far back as Aristotle.  
4.1 The Method 
As a procedure, reflective equilibrium can be considered in analogy with the scientific method: we aim at 
building a theory that is able to fit with the relevant data together. But while for the scientific method the 
data are empirical observations, perceptions, and the like, for reflective equilibrium the data are our pre-
theoretic intuitions, what are called, in Rawls’ terms, “considered judgments”. Considered judgments can 
be conceived of as judgments that, according to Rawls, we make “intuitively”, yet “with the greatest 
confidence” (Rawls, 1971, p. 42). An example in aesthetics could be Levinson’s ‘most entrenched belief’ 
that musical works are created.   
Roughly, the method dictates that one should work back-and-forth between one’s considered judgments 
on the one hand and plausible general principles on the other hand. ‘Working back and forth’ entails 
taking into examination various intuitions to revise, adjust or filter out those of them which turn out to be 
based on prejudice and inferential error. The process succeeds when we arrive at an acceptable level of 
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coherence among the judgments that have stood up under rational examination, or that have been: “duly 
pruned and adjusted” (Rawls, 1971, p. 20) on the basis of theoretical principles such as coherence, 
simplicity, plausibility and the like. Reflective equilibrium represents thus both the final goal and the process 
by which we reflect on and revise our beliefs concerning an area of inquiry. One central point is that only 
after having been carefully selected, adjusted and mutually calibrated can our pre-theoretical intuitions 
assume theoretical relevance. Relevantly, indeed, no claim within the procedure is immune from revision. 
This does not imply, however, that any belief is equally susceptible to the same amount of revision. 
Intuitions that, for instance, enjoy a great many connections to many of our other intuitions are revisable, 
but demand parallel revision of a vast number of inferentially related beliefs. On the other hand, intuitions 
that have few connections to other intuitions are especially vulnerable (Daniels, 2013). Moreover, 
intuitions need not only be consistent with each other, but also provide support or justification for other 
intuitions. Eventually, the judgments obtained from this process can form the backbone of a theory, but 
the method can also be used to select between competing theories that exhibit greater or lesser degrees of 
coherence with our considered judgments.   
Though the breadth of application of this method is observable in many different domains of 
contemporary philosophy, only recently has it started to attract critical attention on the part of 
philosophers of art.15 One interesting example of how the method of reflective equilibrium can be 
fruitfully adopted in ontology of art comes from D. Davies (2004; 2009; 2017). Davies famously articulates 
this methodology in what he calls ‘pragmatic constraint’: “Artworks must be entities that can bear the sorts of 
properties rightly ascribed to what are termed ‘works’ in our reflective critical and appreciative practice; that are individuated 
in the way such ‘works’ are or would be individuated, and that have the modal properties that are reasonably ascribed to 
‘works,’ in that practice” (Davies, 2004, p. 18). 
In accordance with a descriptivist perspective, Davies maintains that the main concern of art ontology 
should be to account for our art-related practices. Theoretical claims about the ontology of art and music 
must be constrained by features of our creative and appreciate practices: “It is our practice that has primacy and 
that must be foundational for our ontological endeavors, because it is our practice that determines what kinds of properties, in 
general, artworks must have” (Davies, 2009, p. 162). However, according to Davies, it is not the whole bunch of 
our existing intuitions about artistic practice that is supposed to play such a determining role in ontology, 
but only those intuitions that “turn out to be acceptable upon reflection” (Davies, 2017, p. 120). We should 
only look at those intuitions governing the practice “that would survive ʻrational reflectionʼ ” (Davies, 2004, p. 
20 my emph.). Before they can be used as constrain to ontological theorizing, intuitions must thus be duly 
pruned and adjusted. This process of steady calibration and adjustment, according to Davies, is a priority 
for any ontological investigation: reflection has indeed to precede, warrant and establish the inquiry. Only 
after rational reflection has confirmed that certain properties are rightly ascribed to what are called ‘works’ 
in a certain artistic practice, can we derive a conclusion about the ontological nature of artworks (Davies, 
2004, p. 23).  
4.2. Application to Descriptivism 
Relevantly, thus, Davies’ approach conjoins the descriptivist’s plea for the primacy of practice with a 
method akin to Rawls’ reflective equilibrium. Accepting his methodological proposal, on the other hand, 
might help descriptivists overcome some of the difficulties implicit in their view. Here are some of the 
reasons why I think this might be the case. 
                                                     
15 Among these, see: Gracyk (2008), and Cooke (2012).   
  [Vol. 8/ 2] 
  2019 
 
69 
In the first place, embracing reflective equilibrium implies that one acknowledges the possibility that 
aspects of our intuitions about artistic and musical practices can be at least partially revised. This means 
that the descriptivists get rid with the idea that all our intuitions regarding musical practice are to be taken 
as indispensable or sacrosanct or unrevisable, and that they all deserve to find a place in our ontology. By 
contrast, while recourse to intuition is maintained, one should learn to use it cautiously, and subject it to 
rational scrutiny and examination. To this extent, when conflicting intuitions can be justified only through 
extremely difficult theorizing, it might be best to sacrifice a few of them for the sake of the consistency of 
the whole theory. In these cases, non-ontological intuitions can also be used to adjudicate between rival 
ontologies of musical works.  
Consider for example the ‘identification debate’ over what kinds of aesthetic or artistic properties are 
essential for a musical work’s identity. The sonicists’ intuition is that only notational aspects are essential, 
so changes in instrumentation do not affect the work’s identity (Kivy, 1988). Instrumentalists, on the 
other hand, assume that since musical works are largely determined by their context of creation, they have 
to be performed using the original instruments indicated by the composer (Levinson, 1990). The former 
argue that individuating musical works must only take into account what is prescribed for correct 
performances by the score, since all the relevant properties to be grasped in aesthetic appreciation depend 
upon the manifest properties of the artistic product, say, the perceptible properties of the sound-sequence 
that complies with the composer’s specification. The latter, on the other hand, reply that any proper 
assessment of the work depends on these properties being accurately complemented by consideration of 
the medium employed in their production, i.e., the kind of instrument used to produce the sound-
sequence, the concert hall etc.  
Both accounts, as it happens, rely on consistent assumptions and have sound arguments to support their 
intuitions. If musical ontology were to salvage all these opposing intuitions as indispensable, each with its 
own specific demands, this would generate a very awkward account of the identity of musical works. In 
this case, reflective equilibrium may lead one to adopt a theory that might conflict with some of the 
assumptions we started with, regarding our underlying understanding of musical practice. Alternatively, it 
may lead one to resolve the conflict by giving up on the search for a single unified theory to account for 
all our intuitions. Conflicting intuitions can indeed be the result of different generative contexts and 
traditions. For example, as noted by S. Davies (2001), while the sonicist assumption works well for 
baroque oeuvres, whose instrumentation is flexible by definition, the instrumentalist idea is best exemplified 
by Romantic symphonies where instrumentation is explicitly specified by the composer. Sometimes, thus, 
reflective equilibrium may suggest that we see what is distinctive about particular cases and revise or refine 
our intuitions and principles before we arrive at a consistent understanding. Other times it may indicate 
that we cannot resolve disputes unless we bring more theoretical considerations to bear. In all situations 
however, a thoughtful process of reflection is needed before any intuition can be considered in our 
ontology. 
Secondly, and relatedly, adopting reflective equilibrium also has an impact on the type of knowledge that is 
achievable by means of descriptivist ontological theorizing. This is because the method carries along an 
intrinsically normative constrain. As a rationalizing procedure for our intuitions, reflective equilibrium entails, 
as Davies puts it, “an essentially normative, and not merely descriptive, relationship to the norms that operate in actual 
critical practice and the judgments in accordance with those norms that we actually make” (Davies, 2004, p. 20). The 
normative character of reflective equilibrium, in turn, provides descriptivism with some tools to escape the 
‘deflationist flattery’. Indeed, by acknowledging some degree of revision, adjustment and calibration in our 
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nascent conception of artistic practice, we end up with a knowledge that is not just trifle codification of 
the already-known. This also has implications for the assessment criteria of ontological theories, for it 
suggests that the best proposals on the table are not necessarily those that most comply with our intuitive 
conception of musical and artistic practices simpliciter, but those which give us the most rationally 
consistent justification of why and how people think about art phenomena the way they do.  
More generally, once revised through the lenses of reflective equilibrium, descriptivism guarantees that the 
ontological accounts it validates are substantive, that is, that they achieve what some authors consider the 
major goal of art and musical ontology: to provide us with an adequate reflective explanation (Davies, 2017, p. 
126) of the practices – production, reception, interpretation, evaluation, commodification – to which our 
intuitive conception refers. Reflective explanation means, in this context, “an accurate systematic picture of the 
artworld, making explicit the norms sustained therein: norms that govern recognition, evaluation, and interpretation of artistic 
objects and events” (Kraut, 2014, p. 3). Relevantly, we explain “by adverting to the sorts of things artworks are” for 
“their ontological status explains why they are, or ought to be treated, in one way rather than another” (Kraut, 2014, p. 5). 
It is vital to see that such explanations are not merely in the business of ‘conceptual analysis’ – ratifying or 
codifying our ‘conceptual scheme’ – but in the business of accounting for the artistic phenomena of our 
interest; there is more to a rational reconstruction of this sort than merely attesting to what ‘real’ people 
do or think. In this picture, ontology is in the business of shaping “a theoretical background against which 
properly aesthetic questions can be addressed, one permitting the formulation of a wide variety of views and arguments, 
precisely that dizzy variety of claims that constitute our artistic practices” (Rohrbaugh, 2013, p. 239). And this implies 
in the first place attempting to find rational grounds for our judgments by means of that continual process 
of examination of concepts and intuitions that goes by the name of reflective equilibrium.   
5. Conclusions 
In this paper, I have made a case for reflective equilibrium as a methodology able to overcome some of 
the problems faced by standard descriptivism in art and musical ontology. On the one hand, involving a 
process of adjustment and revision of intuitions, reflective equilibrium may help descriptivists address the 
instability of intuitions as ontological evidence. On the other hand, by introducing a normative dimension 
into ontological theorizing, it may grant that the resulting theories achieve explanatory power with regard 
to our art and musical practices.  
One could argue, however, that it remains unclear in what sense the intuitions retained by the descriptivist 
are ‘intuitive’ at all (Bartel, 2017, p. 351). In other words, to whom are these claims intuitive? Rather than 
reflecting actual musical practice, the intuitions used by ontologists might in fact turn out to be the 
product of their philosophical commitments (Bartel, 2017, p. 364).  
This may be indicative of a more general problem for descriptivism (see: Williamson, 2007, pp. 244–246). 
Even if reflective equilibrium were ultimately proven to be a suitable methodology for musical and art 
ontology (which would clearly require more study than can be carried out in the extent of a single paper), 
this in no way would contribute to justifying the epistemic reliability of intuitions, whose philosophical 
reputation remain questionable. In other words, what guarantees that the outcome of such a process of 
steady calibration and adjustment would be nothing other than an internally consistent set of false 
prejudices?  
I reply by agreeing with the premise that clarifying the function of intuitions in the ontology of art and 
music – and philosophy in general – is crucial. Until light is shed on the epistemic status of the class of 
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judgments that are part of the method of reflective equilibrium – that is, until one has specified what kind 
of evidence intuitions provide – there could be no definitive basis for assessing the reliability of the 
method in question.  
Nevertheless, even in the absence of such a theory, reflective equilibrium should not be discarded as 
arbitrary. Precisely because only some of our intuitions can be trusted, while other cannot, so that we can 
easily mistake a biased intuition for a trustworthy one, we need a method that help us rationally reconstruct 
our beliefs and intuitive judgments and their logical interconnections. Reflective equilibrium might thus be 
the philosophical equivalent of finding a smooth curve through the disparate and disordered data points 
that constitute our artistic practices. I trust everyone understands the difference between merely joining 
the dots and trying to figure out a pattern behind them.   
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